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The traditional view, based on these and other examples, holds that judicial review has largely failed to protect individual rights when their protection is most needed. There are good reasons to suspect that this would be so, and, as the examples cited above illustrate, there is plenty of evidence to support the conventional wisdom. But the conventional wisdom is too pessimistic. It is akin to arguing that
Marbury demonstrates the weakness of the judiciary because the Court failed to afford Marbury himself relief for the violation of his rights.
Considered over time, judicial review of emergency and national security measures can and has established important constraints on the exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the scope of what is acceptable in future emergencies. Because emergency measures frequently last well beyond the de facto end of the emergency, and because the wheels of justice move slowly, courts often have an oppor tunity to assess the validity of emergency measures after the emer gency has passed, when passions have been reduced and reasoned judgment is more attainable. In doing so, courts have at least some times been able to take advantage of hindsight to pronounce certain emergency measures invalid for infringing constitutional rights. And because courts, unlike the political branches or the political culture more generally, must explain their reasons in a formal manner that then has precedential authority in future disputes, judicial decisions offer an opportunity to set the terms of the next crisis, even if they often come too late to be of much assistance in the immediate term.
Thus, the Court has over time developed a highly protective test for speech advocating illegal activity,5 subjected all racial discrimination since Korematsu to exacting scrutiny,6 and prohibited guilt by associa tion.7 These decisions, among others, impose important limits on what the government can do in the current, post-September 11th crisis.
Since Marbury, scholars have devoted thousands of pages to debating the issue of judicial review, offering critiques of Chief Justice
Marshall's reasoning, proposing alternative defenses of judicial review, and, more recently, questioning the value of judicial review altogether.
One of the most familiar, and in my view still the strongest, defenses of judicial review is that first advanced in footnote four of Carotene 
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everyday politics, the Court is best suited to protect the interests of those who cannot protect themselves through the political process, whether they be members of discrete and insular minorities, dissi dents, noncitizens, or other vulnerable individuals. As others have shown, the Court does not always live up to its responsibility.10 But it is nonetheless an important ideal to which courts should be held accountable.
How should we judge judicial review from the standpoint of pro tecting the constitutional rights and liberties of the vulnerable in times of crisis? It is in times of crisis that constitutional rights and liberties are most needed, because the temptation to sacrifice them in tl�e name of national security will be at its most acute. To government officials, civil rights and liberties often appear to be mere obstacles to effective protection of the national interest. As Bush-administration supporters frequently intone when defending their post-September 11th initia tives, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."11 Judicial protection is also critical because crisis measures are typically targeted at the most vulnerable among us, especially noncitizens, who have little or no voice in the political process.12 We have been in such a crisis period since September 11th and will be for the foreseeable future. So now is a particularly propitious time to assess the value of judicial review in times of crisis.13
Part I of this Article will set forth the traditional view that the judi ciary is inadequate in times of crisis, along with the evidence that supports it and the reasons that might explain it. Part II maintains that the traditional view overstates the case, because over time judicial de cisions have had more of a constraining influence on emergency measures than appears when one looks only at the courts' performance in the midst of a crisis. Part III surveys judicial performance since September 11th on matters of national security and argues that while the record is far from exemplary, courts have actu ally been more willing to stand up to the government in this period than in many prior crises. Part IV responds to a recent proposal by 10. See, e.g. , GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
11. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Narrow, Prudent, and Impeccable, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002. The quote comes from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
I develop this point in DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003) (hereinafter COLE, ENEMY ALIENS].
13. I will resist offering broad generalizations about judicial review. Generalizing about judicial review from the standpoint of how courts act in national emergencies is, to me, as invalid as judging the propriety of judicial review on the basis of the Supreme Court's performance in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) . The fact that courts, like all other institu tions, are susceptible to political pressure in times of high crisis does not warrant a rejection of judicial review in general or of the ideals that animate it. I address only the somewhat more specific question of how judicial review works in emergencies and on matters of na tional security.
two leading scholars that courts and the Constitution ought to play less of a role in assessing emergency measures.14 Professors Oren Gross and Mark Tushnet have both recently argued that the poor perform ance of courts during emergency periods and the need for extraordi nary emergency powers should impel us to acknowledge explicitly the validity of extraconstitutional emergency measures and leave judg ment of such measures to the political rather than the judicial process.
In my view, this proposal is fundamentally misguided, both because it fails to acknowledge the valuable role that courts have played, when viewed over time, in constraining emergency powers, and because the alternative of relying on the political process would almost certainly provide even less protection for individual rights than the courts have.
To paraphrase Winston Churchill, judicial review is the worst protec tor of liberty in times of crisis, with the exception of all the others.
I. THE C ONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The conventional wisdom is that courts are ineffective as guardians of liberty when the general public is clamoring for security. Clinton
Rossiter, in an influential study of the Supreme Court in wartime, Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, so vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the individual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me wholly delusive .... If the people ever let com mand of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history. 1 7
Finally, George Bernard Shaw gave the critique his own inimitable flair in offering the following evaluation of the courts during World War!:
[D]uring the war the courts in France, bleeding under German guns, were very severe; the courts in England, hearing but the echoes of those guns, were grossly unjust; but the courts in the United States, knowing naught save censored news of those guns, were stark, staring, raving
There is a wealth of evidence to support this conventional wisdom. There are at least four reasons why courts are likely to fare poorly on matters of national security, especially in times of crisis. First, their independence notwithstanding, judges are part of the government and are likely to identify with the government's interests when matters of national security are at stake. The populace as a whole generally rallies around the executive branch in times of crisis, and courts are likely to do so as well. As history has shown, judges cannot stand above the crisis, precisely because the threat at least presumably implicates them as well -both as part of the government and as part of the society.
Second, assessing claims of national security, especially during times of crisis, is inherently difficult, and judges are likely to feel ill-equipped to do so. Most questions of constitutional rights and liber ties present a question of balancing. Even the prohibition on race dis crimination can be overcome by a sufficiently compelling justification and narrowly tailored means.25 But how does one accurately measure the risk that Al Qaeda might gain critical information enabling it to attack us, or that an individual, if set free, might endanger the national security?
Such decisions must inevitably rest on incomplete information, and the courts' information is often even more incomplete than that of the executive. The executive branch frequently has a monopoly on the information because so much of it is classified, the challengers are often unable to respond, and, absent adversarial testing, it is difficult for a court to know whether the government has been fully candid in its assessment. The Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu, in which it deferred to military claims of necessity as justification for the Japanese internment, was later shown to be based on an inaccurate record; the executive branch concealed from the Court critical infor mation about its own doubts concerning the reality of the threat posed by the Japanese population. Indeed, the executive branch's misrepre sentations were so fundamental that years later courts overturned the convictions on writs of coram nobis.26
Third, courts must worry that if they rule against the government on a matter of national security, they may face a potential test of their credibility and legitimacy. If the Pre$ident truly believes that the secu- Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, judges must worry that if they rule against the government, their decisions might be fo llo wed, at some subsequent cost to national security. Just as no judge wants to be the one who has freed a defendant to commit violent crime again, so no judge wants to issue an order that actually causes serious harm to the national security. And since prognostications about security risks are just that, and one can never really be certain, judges may be inclined to err on the side of caution and the government. At the oral argument before the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media Group v.
Ashcroft,2 9 a case challenging the constitutionality of the Attorney General's decision to close to the public all immigration proceedings involving hundreds of detainees labeled of "special interest" to the September 11th investigation, Judge Morton Greenberg told the ACLU lawyer arguing the case, "We could make a decision here ... The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or depotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority. 45. This claim is subject to an important qualification. While the war on terrorism has not thus far led to the direct criminalization of membership per se in political groups, the government has resurrected the tactic of "guilt by association" in the name of cutting off ter rorist financing. Under a 1996 antiterrorism statute, it is a crime to provide "material sup port" to designated "terrorist organizations," without regard to the intent, purpose, or effect of one's support. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 303(a), 18 U.S.C.
§ 23398 (2003) . Under this statute, it is no defense to show that one's support was in fact intended to support only nonviolent humanitarian activities, nor even to show that one's support was designed to and did in fact reduce a recipient group's reliance on violence. Thus, when one takes a longer view of the role of courts in con straining emergency powers, the picture is less bleak than the conven tional account admits. While most of the developments discussed above came too late to forestall civil rights and civil liberties violations when they were initially undertaken, they have the prophylactic effect of forestalling the same or similar measures in future emergencies.
The judicial process is especially conducive to playing this role for several reasons. First, since emergency powers, and the disputes to which they give rise, tend to outlast the actual emergency, those powers can be reviewed by courts when the worst of the crisis is over. The ability (and obligation) of courts to assess the legality of measures long after they have been adopted means that courts may bring more perspective to the question than those acting in the midst of the emer gency.
Second, the fact that legal decisions must offer a statement of rea sons that then binds future cases contributes to the judiciary's ability to exert control over the next emergency. The obligation to create and to follow precedent means that judicial decisions are likely to have a longer "shelf life" than those of other branches of government. The lawyers' ability to distinguish the current emergency from prior ones, and the current emergency measure from those previously invalidated, means that the obligation to state reasons is no guarantee of future effectiveness in protecting rights, but precedents do tend to take cer tain options off the table. The government could not punish antiwar speech today, for example.
Third, the common-law method facilitates a measured develop ment of rules in the context of specific cases and permits the incorpo ration of lessons learned from the early and often most overreactive stages of emergencies. Once those lessons are learned and instantiated in Supreme Court decisions, they play an important role in precluding certain measures that were part of the government's arsenal in the prior emergency. In this sense, just as in Marbury, the Court's emer gency-powers decisions may not help the parties immediately before it at the height of the controversy, but in the long run these decisions es tablish principles that are critical to checking future government abuse.
Fourth, the formalities of the judicial process mandate the creation of an official record that may facilitate reaching a just result. The conviction in Korematsu was ultimately overturned on a writ of coram nobis because Korematsu was able to show, through access to gov ernment records, that the Justice Department had misled the courts about the strength of the evidence underlying its national-security concerns. As the warrant requirement demonstrates, record-keeping requirements permit evaluation of government actions after the fact.
While judicial proceedings are not necessary to impose record-keeping requirements, the highly formalized judicial process itself creates a record that may make subsequent assessments, beyond the heat of the moment, more reliable.
Fifth, and perhaps most important, federal courts are independent of the political process, and their institutional self-definition turns in significant part on that independence, especially when it comes to the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional rights. As a result, they are better suited to entertain claims challenging executive action than are Congress or the executive branch itself, and more likely to take politically unpopular positions than the political branches. While, as noted above, judges, like other government officials, are likely to defer to the executive branch on matters of national security, complete deference is likely to clash with their understanding of their role as judges.
To be sure, judicial decisions are not the only forces that may constrain government actors in the next emergency. Developing cultural norms may also play a role. As noted above, Korematsu has never been formally overruled, but it is nonetheless highly unlikely that anything on the scale of the Japanese internment would happen again. The cultural condemnation of that initiative, reflected in Congress's issuance of a formal apology and restitution,52 has been so powerful that the option is a nonstarter even without controlling Supreme Court law. But even here, the legislative apology followed judicial decisions nullifying the convictions on writs of coram nobis.53
In addition, the formal requirements that judges give reasons that are It is too early to draw firm conclusions regarding the role of courts in the war on terrorism; we are, after all, still in the initial stages of this crisis, when courts are historically deferential, and the Supreme Court
has not yet weighed in. The lower courts' greater willingness to chal lenge the government's national-security assertions may reflect the fact that the buck does not stop with those courts; any ruling against the government in this area is likely to be but one stop along the road to appeal. The Supreme Court was able to reach the result it did in Marbury in part because it left the President with nothing to defy, and thereby created the space to · announce its doctrine of judicial supremacy. So, too, a district court decision on a matter of national se curity is unlikely to be the judiciary's last word, and therefore it may be easier for a district court to rule against the government's national security assertions. The further up the appellate chain, the more likely a judicial decision will be determinative, and consequently, the more pressure judges may feel to uphold the government's actions. concern about rights, which may lead courts to be more attentive than they might otherwise be to concerns on the liberty side of the security liberty balance.
In short, while courts remain no panacea, we ought not dismiss them too quickly, as they have the potential to play a critical role in checking emergency powers.
IV. A N U NTIMELY P ROPOSAL
Despite these developments, some commentators have recently argued that the Constitution and, by extension, the courts ought not play much of a role at all in restricting the government's emergency powers. Professors Oren Gross and Mark Tushnet have each proposed that in light of the failure of constitutional constraints to limit execu tive action during emergencies, it might be better to recognize explic itly the validity of extraconstitutional measures during emergencies, or put differently, to acknowledge that emergency powers are not gov erned by the Constitution.103 Both do so in large part to avoid tainting 102. One initiative in particular has appeared to be especially influential. Soon after the USA PATRIOT Act was enacted, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee formed to pursue a grassroots strategy of getting local towns and counties to adopt resolutions condemning the civil liberties abuses of the Patriot Act. As of February 2004, 242 jurisdictions had adopted such resolutions, including three states -Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont -and several major cities, including Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, San Francisco, and Albuquerque. See Bill of Rights Def. Comm., http:l/www.bordc.org (last updated Feb. 6, 2004) . The initiative appears to have shifted public views toward the Patriot Act, prompting the Attorney General to launch an unprecedented speaking tour to seek to defend the Act. 103. Gross, supra note 14; Tushnet, supra note 14. Professor George Alexander before them made a similar argument, contending that because courts perform poorly in emergen cies, they should not get involved at all, and "redress must be achieved politically if it is to be effective." George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 27, 65 (1984). Were courts to adopt the Gross-Tushnet notion that extraconstitu tional measures are appropriate during emergencies, and that the only real check is political, much would be lost and little gained in the pro tection of civil liberties.
I would hesitate to adopt the Gross-Tushnet position for several reasons. First, it is predicated on a distinction between "emergency" p�riods and "normal" periods that, as Gross himself has convincingly shown, simply cannot be maintained. As Gross argues, "the belief in our ability to separate emergency from normalcy, counter-terrorism measures from the ordinary set of legal rules and norms," is a danger ous illusion. Even if we were to adopt such a scheme, public officials would be exceedingly unlikely to admit that their actions were extralegal.
Rather, they would almost invariably argue first that their measures were constitutional and argue only in the alternative that their actions were justified even if illegal.123 As a result, courts would continue to have to address the legality of emergency measures, and the drive to accommodate the Constitution to emergency conditions would con tinue to exert pressure on constitutional jurisprudence. Given the open-ended character of the Constitution and the fact that few of the liberties it protects are absolute, there will rarely be an emergency measure that government lawyers cannot defend with some constitu-122. The 1988 statute offering restitution and an apology to the victims of the Japanese internment program suggests that at some point the political process may repudiate prior emergency measures. But that is almost certainly the exception that proves the rule. It took forty years to achieve and came only after the fe deral courts had themselves repudiated the convictions arising from the exclusion and internment programs. See supra note 26. Had the political process been asked to ratify the internment at the time, or in the decade or so that followed it, there is no evidence to suggest the result would have been repudiation rather than ratification.
123. See FINN, supra note 54, at 9 (1991) ("Even public officials who propose action that is arguably extraconstitutional typically seek to justify their actions on constitutional grounds."). 128. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 296-97 (arguing that the Justice Department's selective targeting of Arab and Muslim foreign nationals for questioning, secret detentions and trials, and selective deportation "does not seem to be a violation of civil liberties," and if so, are only "violations of the rights of residents who are not U.S. citizens"). In my view, these ac tions violated a wide range of constitutional rights, and the fact that they specifically affected foreign nationals, the most vulnerable and voiceless among us, only exacerbates the wrongs. See generally COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12.
War II, illustrate that legislators are exceedingly unlikely to stand up against executive power in the name of civil liberties during emergen cies. The need to be seen as "doing something" about the threat often translates into legislation that delegates sweeping powers to the execu tive branch.
Only the courts have an obligation to entertain claims of rights violations. The executive and legislative branches can simply choose to ignore such claims, and are likely to do so when those claims are not backed by substantial political power or influence. By contrast, assuming standing and justiciability, courts must adjudicate any claim that a government initiative violates constitutional rights. As a result, courts are often the only forum realistically available. For more than two years, the President has asserted the unilateral power to detain anyone he labels as an enemy combatant. Congress has done nothing to check or limit or even seriously address this assertion of power released, its decision would often receive coverage in the print media.
But I received countless phone calls from television news producers over the years looking for legal stories, all of whom ultimately deter mined that the secret evidence story would not sell because it involved foreign nationals rather than citizens.136 For my clients, it was court or nothing, court or more years of detention based on evidence they could not see. And to their credit, the courts were uniformly skeptical of the government's claims, and protective of the foreign nationals' right to see the evidence being used to deprive them of their liberty.137
Even immigration judges, who as administrative judges ultimately re viewable by the Attorney General lack the independence of the fed eral courts, were highly skeptical of the government's claims.138
Because courts are the only realistic option available to those targeted by emergency measures, and precisely because judges are all too human and already face substantial pressure to avoid fulfilling their responsibility, it seems especially misguided to advocate that they do so. The formal guarantees and ethical obligation of independence do not mean that judges are in fact always impartial and courageous, but the insistence that it is their obligation to be independent is critical to the enterprise of judging. We should not let judges off the hook when it comes to emergency matters, because they are the only real option for most persons targeted by emergency measures. As Fred Schauer has eloquently argued in a different setting, "The mere fact that courts will fold under pressure, however, does not dictate that they should be told that they may fold under pressure, because the effect of the message may be to increase the likelihood of folding even when the pressure is less."139 Schauer continued, "Resisting the inevi table is not to be desired because it will prevent the inevitable, but 136. I am aware of only one exception. CBS's 60 Minutes covered the story of the gov ernment's use of secret evidence to deny entry to a group of Iraqis who had been involved in a failed CIA-backed coup attempt against Saddam Hussein, had been airlifted out of Iraq by the United States, but had then been determined at the border to have been double agents based on classified evidence. 60 Minutes: Unfinished Business: Six Iraqis Brought to the United States by the US Government fo r Help Against Saddam Hussein Are Imprisoned on Undisclosed Charges by the INS (CBS television broadcast, July 25, 1999). But it is likely that 60 Minutes' interest in the story stemmed as much from the identity of the Iraqis' pro bono lawyer -former CIA Director James Woolsey -as from their predicament. 138. See Cole, supra note 134, at 272-75. The immigration judges' skepticism suggests that relief was sometimes available within the executive branch. But it is significant that the relief came only from judges within the executive branch. In my view, the historical record does not demonstrate that courts will inevitably fold under the pressure of emergencies, but only that they will often do so. The historical developments reviewed above suggest that at least some judges may have learned from history to demand more narrowly tailored responses to emergencies. But more important, the record also shows that by exercising their responsibility to decide cases pitting individual rights against emergency executive power, the courts have over time developed rules that do constrain the executive in the next emergency. The danger of Gross and Tushnet's proposal is that we would be sacrificing even that for benefits that seem evanescent at best.
CONCLUSION
Courts, like every other institution of human governance, are imperfect. Tasked with the job of enforcing individual constitutional rights against the majority's will, judges remain prone to the same fears and anxieties that afflict us all during times of crisis. Thus, it should not be a surprise that courts have all too often deferred to unfounded assertions of government power on issues of national secu rity; when the executive claims that the fate of the nation is at stake, it takes real courage to stand up to that assertion and subj ect it to careful scrutiny. Madison itself, these decisions may well be more important over the long run than their bottom lines would make them appear in the short run.
Given the salutary role that courts have played in enforcing consti tutional limits on emergency responses, and given the paucity of credible alternatives, we should be reluctant to let judges off the hook.
There seems to be little reason to trust the political branches to be more attentive to constitutional rights concerns than courts, even if courts themselves do not always perform as we might hope they 140. Id. at 1085. 
